This will take some time so bear with me as I write it. If you wish to comment, please email.
To do this properly I will have to fill in a lot of gaps. The argument is:
How would you prove that there are no turtles in Tasmania?
One counter-example is sufficient to prove this wrong. Depending on the counter-example the claim may still be made, although now it should be qualified. If you call you car “turtle” and travel on the Spirit of Tasmania, then there is now one turtle in Tasmania but… The same inhibition to ignore a ‘counter-example’ would be valid if you were presented with a turtle statue, a Ninja Turtle movie or a Turtle Moth (if such a creature exists).
As a general rule, zoos are for exotic creatures and nature parks for natives so a turtle exhibited in a Tasmanian zoo would lead credence to the claim that they are not native. Not a good example of an exception-proves-the-rule argument as this is not a strong rule with most zoos including native exhibits. The point is that an example which is accepted as an exception
This hints at a major justification for things we know. We know things by accepting an appropriate authority. In this case the existence of an exhibit in a zoo. Obviously I will have much to say about this. Although the ‘rule’ about exhibits in a zoo is not reliable, we would rely on turtle experts in two ways. Turtle experts can tell us where to look for turtles and they can tell us if Tasmania is the sort of place where one would expect to find turtles.
Although I will rabbit on about authority I am not an authority on this so my purported rules about these rules will have to be applied to themselves. Of course, you should do this anyway — one of my rules?
We also need experts to tell us what we are talking about. It may be the case that biologists only use the term ‘turtle’ for marine animals. In Australian constitutional law, State jurisdiction stops at the high water mark. Given this one could say “There are no turtles in Tasmania”. On the other hand we may consider the question one for common use of terms and so rush off to a lexicographer.
The notion of ‘authority’ is more than old manuscripts and people in lab coats. I have in mind the theories and world views that also help us accept points and suggestions as true. Part of all this is how readily we accept evidence. One-eyed climate skeptics or creationists appear not to accept anything showing anthropogenic global warming or evolution. If this is really true than we can dismiss them out of hand. On the other hand, the ‘just so’ explanations that particularly appear in the popular press are just plain embarrassing.
As a small example, when I did an experiment at school I noticed that my results better fitted the rule that F = ma2. The Physics teacher pointed out that we cannot expect much quality from simple experiments on a school lab bench. Especially in this environment, the teacher was quite correct to dismiss evidence that contradicted centuries of scientific work but, if all had gone well, we were expected to accept Newton’s Law from the same one-off simple experiment. It is probably fair to say that we were being taught Science, with a little bit of role-playing, rather than doing Science ourselves. Nothing funny here.
Doing Philosophy can appear to be socially aggressive — questioning and poking at anything and everything even turtles. It is not just aggression (for its own sake) as we can talk to each other, we can have this conversation.
Words also change with time. Aristotle did experiments to show that speed is proportional to effort but this was revised by Newton. Aristotle’s experiments were fine. What is being measured has changed. Another example is the the term ‘light’. You may think of light as just contrasted with dark. It makes no sense to ask how fast does dark travel and so it was with light until the word changed. (Notice that words that appear to be simple opposites are not necessarily so.)
Okay. More about what it is to know something later. In the meantime, “Are there turtles in Tasmania?”
So we are looking for cute little reptiles on the big block of land down south. Experts and common sense suggests not paying much attention to tree-tops although a literature search (sorry experts again) is warranted on the possibility of flying turtles or tortoises. Everyone knows they lay eggs on Queensland beeches so a close search of Tasmanian beaches is needed. Again turtle-philes will guide us. We don’t look very hard to see if there is an elephant in the room but have to work a lot harder to rule out e coli. A thorough search of Tasmania would be extremely onerous but this only reflects on the confidence of our final conclusion.
Another hint here. We do know things through Science but often the result from a scientific investigation is only a probability. After we do the work we still have to determine what it is we have found. A lovely colony of turtles living happily in the Launceston precinct would suffice to say we know there are turtles in Tasmania. Unless the family was put there as part of a elaborate hoax.
Maps and atlases of Tasmania do not have the message Here Be Turtles. Does this count? Are cartographers not up to scratch in the expertise arena?
We talk about lots of things. One of the interesting presumptions is that what we talk about actually exists. This is not a declaration of the form “Hamlet is paranoid” means “Hamlet is paranoid AND Hamlet exists”. This is too strong. The most it means is that there is the supposition that the audience knows the context where Hamlet does exists, that is, in the play by Shakespeare. Because of this we can write our essays for English Literature talking about nothing. We are confused when we don’t know what people are talking about. We are not asserting the statements are false.
“Unicorns are mythical creatures with one horn” is fine: “Unicorns have one horn and do not exist” is nonsense.
We talk about lots of things together as though they are all the same sorts of things. The classic is talking about “body and soul”. When we introduce a team of footballers it would be nonsense to then ask for the esprit de corps but this is an important component of any team.
The first paragraph under this heading is a hint from my thesis for a Bachelor of Letters (see Philosophy). The second is a hint from a book by Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind. Just to let you know there is lots more for the keen.
Just talking about something doesn’t mean we are making any claims about what type of thing it is. We do not necessarily claim the subject exists like you and me, stones and clouds. You cannot poke your finger into truth, justice or even red. I have never been comfortable with the claim that Existence is not a predicate. ‘Exists’ is just a word we do not often use. We do look for things such as the Higgs boson, extraterrestrial life, exoplanets and turtles in Tasmania. We also look for happiness. Nothing funny here!
Several centuries of philosophy just summarily dismissed!
Theism is a broad church: gods come in many guises. Each claim has to be addressed based on the claim.
When you put all the red things side by side you will not have included ‘red’. Pantheism is like this. Lots of things exists, but not one bit more. Does red exist? Yes! and so does everything red but it is not the same. Pantheism may express an attitude, an optimism, a religious experience, a gentle warmth in the belly, a pretend latch to hang pretentious ideas. There is no god. A little of this creeps into a number of claims about god, for example, “God is good”. The subliminal argument is that there are undoubtedly good things in the world and this should lead inexorably to theism.
There are undoubtedly bad things but this also does not prove that God does not exist. There is one difference. Accepting that there are good and wonderful things does not commit you to believe that God exists but if you accept at least one bad thing can you continue to believe that God does exist?
Does red exist without red things? Does a tree fall silently in the forest? Two issues here. Sound and colour are experiences. The experience relies both on something with a particular property and an observer who picks up or reacts somehow to the property. The redness may be produced in a number of ways. I believe the physics is different behind red stained glass, red biros and red butterflies. Physicists also tell us that the common element here is photons of a certain energy. Photons of a certain energy do exist but they are not red. The experience of red is our reaction to these photons.
As this is a personal experience, how do I know that when you say “red” you mean the same thing that I do when I see red? The very short answer (and only correct one) is “Don’t be stupid”.
There are good things in the world but this is our response, our assessment. Our deliberations may be fundamentally different from our sensual experiences like seeing red but in this respect they are the same. Good things exist; mountain views, aspirin and random acts of kindness. Goodness exists only in the same way that redness does but really this is stretching the use of the word. Those with a vested interest like to push this extension against the “Bah Humbug”s in the world but they are attacking straw-men. Some atheist delight in the wonders of nature and the goodness of people: others are just plain grouchy.
The tree falls silently in the forest not because there is no forest, no trees, no air movement but because there is no hearing, no one there to hear.
Synesthetes may see seven as red, Picasso saw sevan as a nose. These are not examples of metaphors. On the other hand, ‘God exists’ may be metaphorical. What does this mean? To throw light on this we start with a real metaphor. There are no photons of meaning but both photons are real and there is a real question to understand. What is real behind a metaphorical god? Does the invocation of a metaphor add anything to the discussion? I want my god to add up to something: To be counted.
So far I have touched on aspects that I believe should inform our conversation. We have to be clear on the subject matter. This essay does not invalidate most religions, just the core of the Abrahamic tradition of monotheism. We have to identify what it means to find what we seek, to identify both the techniques to use and to identify the evidence that we will accept. In this context, I suggest that it is valid to review the history of this discussion. A wealth of material has been accumulated in the Abrahamic tradition. We will find our God here in their discourses on religion, philosophy, theology, mysticism not in their economics, physics, sport or geography.
Later I will indicate why I believe this to be valid but it is useful (for my argument) to show that this history is not kind to monotheism even though a simple head count (in Christian, Jewish or Islamic countries) most likely would show overwhelming support.
To do this properly I should review the text in context, that is, look at the Latin Aquinas actually wrote bearing in mind the meaning of the words as understood in his time and for his cohort. I haven’t a chance. My defense is that my conclusions here are not controversial. It is generally accepted that St Thomas Aquinas failed to prove that God exists.
The Summa Theologica was just a beginner’s guide for first year theology students so it would be unfair to only nit-pick on a few words from this thirteenth century blog. My main point is that history has not been kind to the ideas suggested by Aquinas, that these ideas do cover the topic and that this historical consensus is important.
A standard and useful starting point, in traditional philosophical schools, is looking at the summary of the five ways by St Thomas Aquinas in his work Summa Theologica. The ‘proofs’ are:
To complete these we should add the two other historical arguments, the ontological argument and the ‘proof’ from mystics, “I see God, therefore, God exists”.
The existence of God can be proved in five ways.
The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas Second and Revised Edition, 1920 Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province Online Edition Copyright © 2008 by Kevin Knight
Wood can burn but does not spontaneously combust. The wood needs to be externally heated. So it is with everything. Changes are indeed happening all around us but all of these have to be triggered by something else. Ultimately there has to be something that does not change but can cause other changes “and this we call God”.
Please note that the ‘movement’ here is not necessarily a movement back in time. The usual story is that the critical point here is the notion of an infinite regress. By coincidence, my last under-graduate assignment was on this topic. The point comes up again in other arguments so I will leave my comments until a little later. The standard answer is that the first way will not stand without this appeal to the impossibility of an infinite regression of changes.
As I said I will get back to infinity later but, in the meantime, also consider the premise that all things change because of an external change. This is not so evident. Consider a mixture of fluids where there is an initial difference in temperature. Unless there is external interferences (movement if you must), the temperature differences in the mix are eventually eliminated. What are we to call ‘external’ here? Are blobs of the same temperature “things” moved by “things” called blobs of a different temperature. This is not like wood and fire. Remember I want my God to be something.
Another way of saying this is that the argument from the unmoved mover is either a scientific question or a metaphysical question. If the argument is just about things, then modern Science is comfortable with its understanding of change as reflected in the notion of ‘enthrophy’. Science is not comfortable about extremes, such as, before the Big Bang, inside a singularity, but I would not like to ground my theism on the current scientific confusion here. If the argument is meant to have a metaphysical component, then all the standard objections stand, including those by Aquinas himself.
The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.
The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence--which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.
The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.
This is out of place. I will fix later
Things change. Rocks weather and rocks can hurt. In grammar we use labels like verbs or predicates. One subset of doing things invokes notions about purpose or intent. To get a gist of this topic see, for example, John Austin paper, A Plea for Excuses. Here Austin, when talking about how to do philosophy, uses an example from what is termed the Philosophy of Action. The critical issue for this discussion is that purposeful actions are only a subset of all actions. We love, shop and lie but also breathe, grow, and stumble. When asked “What are we doing?” we don‘t point to our finger nails and say “Growing”.
In special circumstances, things can also have a purpose, for example, a street signpost, some articles of clothing or props in a novel or play. Once again, it is just not valid to look for the motive, reason or plan for everything.
To look for the meaning of life is pretentious. We do not look for the meaning of lice, rocks, red or galaxies. What we are saying when we ask for the meaning of life is that, like in a play, we were created and that this action was willful. It is not necessary to make the much stronger claim that everything has a purpose but whenever this question is asked, the presumption is that we are important and, at least, our life is just one of those things that has a purpose or meaning even if we cannot quite pin this down.
It is easy to identify that this is a really fatuous argument for the existence of God but, of course, this is a straw man. The point usually is not that life’s meaning proves the existence of God but that an implication for atheism is that life has no meaning. The answer to this observation is also simple. It doesn’t.
The romantic in me pleads to add that some bits do. And isn‘t it wonderful when this happens.
A related idea is design. We see shapes and forms and this cannot be random: there must be a designer.
Things don’t come with labels. We identify patterns and put labels on those patterns. It is purely functional to allow us to talk to each other. Physicist tell us that light is a wave with attributes of frequency and amplitude. Our words for colour (frequency) is much richer than our language for intensity (amplitude). We have a word for a hill and a word for a valley but no word for the lovely combination we see in the landscape. Note that we can quite easily talk about this pretty combination without the need for a specific word. Painters and graphic designers are happy playing with colours and shading.
How do patterns form in a random universe? Please talk to a theoretical physicist about this. My take is that not every random movement is the same. Circular movement produces something stable that can be labeled. We have had a long history explaining the stars and planets based on ever increasing mixes of circles. In mathematics we recognize other stable forms. a + b = b + a is always true but a - b = b - a is not. This is the field of Symmetry. In Physics, one important example here is Noether’s theorem. My crude take on all this is that random movements do create things because not all random movements behave the same. Wind in a circle produces a tornado. The rest is just hot air.