This is the thesis for my Bachelor of Letters degree, awarded in 1983 by the Australian National University.
by
Darryl George Seto
CHAPTER l — Bertrand Russell’s paper “On Denoting”
CHAPTER 3 — ‘Referring’ and ‘denoting’.
CHAPTER 4 — Another look at Russell’s puzzles.
CHAPTER 5 — Some conclusions about successful referring, language and descriptions of human actions.
In the paper “On Denoting”1 B Russell attempts to provide a theory to resolve some problems associated with denoting phrases. The paper does not purport to discuss names or common nouns which by themselves appear as a subject of a proposition; it deals only with phrases which perform this role. The analysis offered by Russell could be extended to names and common nouns if the expedient is accepted of substituting an appropriate phrase for the name or noun as Russell himself does when discussing the name “Apollo”2. The importance of Russell’s paper is not that it identifies any advantage that such a restriction may bring. It is rather that Russell noted the complexity required of any (formal) theory on denoting and that any theory is required for service in many disciplines.
“The subject of denoting is of very great importance not only in logic and mathematics, but also in theory of knowledge.”3
And later Russell added
“Of the many other consequences of the view I have been advocating, I will say nothing. I will only beg the reader not to make up his mind against the view — as he might be tempted to do, on account of its apparently excessive complication — until he has attempted to construct a theory of his own on the subject of denotation. This attempt, I believe, will convince him that it cannot have such a simplicity as one might have expected beforehand.”4
Russell’s critics have pointed out, I believe correctly, that some basic beliefs of Russell about the use of language are false. Unfortunately these critics ignored the task of recreating a formal apparatus. Saul Kripke, for example, said in “Naming and Necessity”
“other conditions must be satisfied in order to make this into a really rigorous theory of reference. I don’t know that I’m going to do this because, first, I’m sort of too lazy at the moment; secondly, rather than giving a set of necessary and sufficient conditions which will work for a term like reference, I want to present just a better picture than the picture presented by the received views.”5
In the first paragraph of Russell’s article it is suggested that denoting phrases are grammatical: “Thus a phrase is denoting in virtue of its form.”6 The grammar by itself will give no hints of the intended object. That is, as Russell points out
“(1) A phrase may be denoting, and yet not denote anything; e.g. ‘the present King of France’. (2) A phrase may denote one definite object; e.g. ‘the present King of England’ denotes a certain man. (3) A phrase may denote ambiguously; e.g. ‘a man’ denotes not many men, but an ambiguous man.”7
Russell later claims that “a denoting phrase is essentially part of a sentence, and does not, like most single words, have any significance on its own account.”8 In the three points just outlined Russell has also noted three ways in which denoting may go astray. In the first case Russell has noted that a meaningful expression such as ‘the present King of England’ becomes ‘odd’ when a similar expression ‘the present King of France’ is used. (It has also become ‘odd’ with the passage of time.) Later Russell considers what could be called permanent non-entities, that is “The whole realm of non-entities, such as ‘the round square’, ‘the even prime other than 2’, ‘Apollo’, ‘Hamlet’, etc.”9 There is perhaps a fourth possibility where the grammatical structure suggests that a denoting phrase is wished but the phrase could not be said to be denoting. One way is if the implied denoting phrase is just nonsense, such as ‘the yellow justice in the corner of the intimidation’. It is arguable that expressions such as ‘the round square’ are not denoting phrases (or anything else) rather than a weaker claim.
These expressions do not (could not) denote anything. If ‘the round square’ is a denoting phrase, then some sense must be made of the juxtaposition of the adjective ‘round’ and the noun ‘square’ further to the claim that figures, such as squares, are able to be qualified by shape attributes, such as ‘round’. (This last point distinguishes the phrase ‘the round square’ from the earlier nonsense ‘the yellow justice in the corner of the intimidation’.)
A phrase which highlights Russell’s emphasis in this area is the denoting phrase ‘the centre of mass of the Solar System’. He comments
“… we have no immediate acquaintance with this point, which is only known to us by description.”10
The contrast introduced here is between designating an object by ostensive definition (acquaintance) on the one hand, or by means of the phrase’s meaning (connotation, sense, intention) on the other. As we cannot be acquainted with the centre of mass of the Solar System, or, Russell’s other example here, “other people’s minds”.11 Russell, in this theory of denoting, has accentuated the use made of the meaning or connotation of the phrase itself. (These examples were introduced to indicate the distinction between acquaintance and knowledge about.)
It has been argued that Russell was mistaken in this emphasis when he suggested (following the paradigm) that successful denoting is achieved (only) by virtue of the descriptive content in the denoting phrase. Later I shall develop some of this criticism but here I wish to put forward two considerations. Firstly, as I have just paraphrased Russell’s theory I used words suggesting human agency, “successful” and “achieved”. Russell did not attempt to distinguish between pragmatic, semantic or any other implications made when using denoting phrases. Insofar as denoting phrases appear in sentences which themselves appear in a broader context and, as speaking is a human act, there may be implications arising from the use of a denoting phrase beyond the composite meaning gleaned from the words appearing in the denoting phrase. Secondly, Russell’s restriction in looking at phrases not names or nouns is not entirely helpful. Keith Donnellan in his paper “Reference and Definite Descriptions”12 noted that some definite descriptions come “… closer to performing the function of Russell’s proper names than certainly he supposed.”13 And Saul Kripke added
“In the case of some terms, people might have doubts as to whether they’re names or descriptions; like ‘God’ — does it describe God as the unique divine being or is it a name of God?”14
If Russell perceived a real difference in the way names and phrases denote, then at the very least he has failed to draw an adequate dividing line.
The analysis of the sentence ‘I met a man’ presented by Russell is “‘“I met x, and x is human” is not always false’.”15
The denoting phrase ‘a man’ has been substituted by a symbol devoid of any meaning, ‘x’, and a predicate, ‘is human’. The appropriate predicate in this example ‘I met a man’ could well be ‘is human’ but depending on the circumstances the appropriate predicate could be ‘is male’, ‘is an adult’, ‘is a lover’ and so on. (More accurately, the predicate should not contain another denoting phrase.) Presumably if Russell advocates “that denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves, but that every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning”16, then before a proposition is able to be understood a translation, such as suggested by Russell, must first be undertaken. The predicate must be known (given) before the proposition can be understood (meaningful, judged as true or false). The predicate ‘is human’ is not co-extensive in its use as the phrase ‘a man’. The implications, connotations or significance of these two are different. Essentially the same moves are made by Russell to transform the phrases ‘all men’, ‘no men’, ‘some men’ and ‘every man’. The phrase ‘the man’ is also translated by providing an ‘x’ and an appropriate predicate but in this instance, what I will call, an uniqueness condition is also added. In Russell’s reduction of the sentence ‘The father of Charles II was executed’ the uniqueness condition, as I call it, is
“… and that “if y begat Charles II, y is identical with x is always true of y.”17
In all cases Russell’s interpretations can “give a reduction of all propositions in which denoting phrases occur to forms in which no such phrases occur”.18 With these new forms Russell hoped to be able to solve difficulties associated with denoting phrases. To highlight some of these problems Russell criticises the theories of Meinong and Frege and then sets himself three puzzles for his theory to solve.
The first of Russell’s three puzzles arises when substituting ‘Scott’ for ‘the author of Waverly’ (since Scott was the author of Waverly) in the sentence ‘George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverly’ which becomes ‘George IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott’. The second puzzle looks at the sentence ‘The present King of France is bald’. By the law of the excluded middle, it appears that the present King of France is either bald or not bald. The last puzzle notes the difficulties of denying existence (subsistence, being) of anything. If A differs from B then the difference between A and B subsists. If it is false that A differs from B, what is ‘the difference between A and B’? To say the difference between A and B does not subsist makes this the subject of a proposition. To say this does subsist will also be problematic, for example, infringing the law of contradiction.
If a residual denotation is to take its place within a proposition, then some response is required about the meaningfulness of this denotation. Meinong assigns an object to all denoting phrases but this will infringe the law of contradiction when the purported object does not exist. Frege distinguishes what Russell calls ‘meaning’ and ‘denotation’. However the meaning of a sentence depends on the ‘denotation’ of a phrase and not on the ‘meaning’. In a sentence something is predicated of an object, not of the meaning of the denoting phrase. To assume any role for any denotation in a sentence causes problems:
“Thus if we allow that denoting phrases, in general, have two sides of meaning and denotation, the cases where there seems to be no denotation cause difficulties both on the assumption that there really is a denotation and on the assumption that there really is none.”19
Russell concludes that the solution is to eliminate, totally, any denotation from sentences containing denoting phrases. Later Russell shows further the confusion involved in distinguishing ‘meaning’ and ‘denotation’. He notes that “there must be a logical relation involved, which we express by saying that the meaning denotes the denotation.”20 They are not so easily related. The meaning of the denotation (if any) is not the same as the meaning of the denotating phrase. The denotation of a denotating phrase (if any) is not what the denoting phrase denotes. Furthermore, whatever is said to be true is not said about the meaning of any phrase; rather it is true about the denotation of that phrase. Yet the meaning of the phrase has some function as in Russell’s example of the sentence ‘George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverly’. As Russell commented
“The proposition ‘Scott was the author of Waverly’ ‘has a property not possessed by the proposition ‘Scott was Scott’, namely the property that George IV wished to know whether it was true.”21
A final distinction is raised by Russell between what he terms ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ occurrences of denoting phrases in sentences. Using the denoting phrase ‘the author of Waverly’ from the sentence in Russell’s first puzzle, then this phrase understood as a primary occurrence would be —
“‘One and only one man wrote Waverley, and George IV wished to know whether Scott was that man”22
or
“‘George IV wished to know, concerning the man who in fact wrote Waverley, whether he was Scott.’”23
whereas the secondary occurrence would be —
“‘George IV wished to know whether one and only one man wrote Waverley and Scott was that man.’”24
Such a distinction is only possible where the denoting phrase is to be replaced by a complex such as a conjunction. A question of the scope of the main predicate can then arise and can permit more than one translation. As noted by Russell, problems of substitution as in the first puzzle can only occur when there is a case of secondary occurrence. Russell maintained that the ambiguity shown by this distinction is a fault of language which his theory exposes:
“The ambiguity as between primary and secondary occurrence is hard to avoid in language; but it does no harm if we are on our guard against it.”25
The first puzzle can be resolved by using Russell’s explication of a denoting phrase which eliminates all denoting expressions. The proposition ‘Scott was the author of Waverley’ is not an identity equation between two denotations which may be substituted one for the other. Rather, Russell sees this as more complex with one denotation “Scott” (presumably) and a conjunction of an existence claim, a predication and an uniqueness condition. Although usually no problems arise when substituting ‘Scott’ and ‘the author of Waverley’, the substitution itself is not valid.
There is another interpretation of the sentence ‘George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley.’ This is where there is some doubt about the existence of a person named Scott who supposedly wrote Waverley:
‘One and only one man wrote Waverley, named Scott, and George IV wished to know if he really existed.’
This possibility shows the way that Russell suggests to resolve the second puzzle. The question of scope of any predicate must also extend to the existence claim which forms part of every transformation of denoting phrases. Any positive predication about a non-entity will be false because that leg of the conjunction that claims ‘there is an x …” is false. The sentence ‘The present King of France is bald’ is therefore false and it follows that it is true to claim ‘It is false that the present King of France is bald’. The law of excluded middle is not questioned. The same move is relevant in Russell’s third puzzle. The phrase ‘the difference between A and B’ does not become odd just when A does not differ from B. The denoting phrase ‘the difference between A and B’ implies an existence claim which is true or false depending on the circumstances.
A definition of primary occurrence is not given. Russell’s definition of a secondary occurrence is:
“A secondary occurrence of a denoting phrase may be defined as one in which the phrase occurs in a proposition p which is a mere constituent of the proposition we are considering, and the substitution for the denoting phrase is to be effected in p, not in the whole proposition concerned.”26
If a denoting phrase is used which denotes (or includes?) a non-entity, then if the denoting phrase
“… has a primary occurrence, the proposition containing the occurrence is false if the occurrence is secondary, the proposition may be true.”27
When looking at works of fiction, or the literary, or other, criticism of these works are the authors restricted to propositions where all denoting phrases are to be read as secondary occurrences? And a further restriction must apply that after Russell’s transformation still no existence claim is permitted. As a preliminary point, note that the formula ‘Once upon a time …’ appears only once in a fairy tale — it would be a different story if the formula appeared again other than as a reminder. Also the sentence ‘Unicorns have one horn’ perhaps should be spelled out as ‘The unicorns mentioned in Deuteronomy had one horn’. Either way ‘unicorns’ or the denoting phrase has a primary occurrence and I would suggest both statements are true. A corollary of this is that the sentence ‘I believe that unicorns have one horn’ is true, yet it is false that I believe that unicorns exist. Russell allows that secondary occurrences of denoting phrases involving non-entities may be true but on Russell’s transformation the last sentence could only be true if I believed in the existence of unicorns. Russell does not allow that I may have different (false) beliefs on denoting.
There have been significant developments, by many authors, of the suggestions put forward in the article “On Denoting”. I propose, however, to look at two papers in particular which maintain that Russell was fundamentally incorrect in his views on denoting phrases. These are “Reference and Definite Descriptions”1 by Keith Donnellan and “Naming and Necessity”2 by Saul Kripke.
Russell restricted his analysis to denoting phrases. Keith Donnellan, in his paper, further restricted the subject matter by looking only at definite descriptions. It was these denoting phrases that Russell had proposed be transformed to include the implication that one and only one object fits the description. Donnellan introduced into this discussion a further distinction between ‘attributive’ and ‘referential’ uses of definite descriptions. Donnellan claims that Russell (and others), by ignoring this distinction, had fallen into error in their theories on reference and denoting. Whereas Russell was keen to show how each segment in a sentence operated to ensure a meaningful proposition, Donnellan is concerned with language use. Both issues should be confronted. A formal theory may be restricted to mirroring statements only but can best show clearly and precisely what happens when language is used to refer. A broader approach may introduce valuable examples and as well may show that the use of denoting phrases in sentences other than statements may give rise to different implications.
An example of this is Donnellan’s demonstration that questions do not always assume that a definite description refers to something:
“There are some uses of definite descriptions which carry neither any hint of a referential use not any presupposition or implication that something fits the description.”3
The question, “‘Is De Gaulle the king of France?’”4 makes no assumption that there exists a king of France. On the other hand, this is not true of the question “‘Is the king of France De Gaulle?’”5 A similar observation was made in relation to the use of definite descriptions in commands.6
Insofar as Donnellan can identify propositions which do not fit Russell’s ‘secondary occurrence’ and where no presumption or implication as to existence is made, then there is direct conflict between the two authors. There is further conflict in explaining how referring works if Donnellan can show that successful referring occurs even when the descriptive content of the denoting phrase does not fit the referent.
“Now this would seem to Russell something a definite description could not do, for he assumed that if definite descriptions were capable of referring at all, they would refer to something only in so far as that thing satisfied the description.”7
Donnellan believes that “there is a right thing to be picked out by the audience” and this is not captured by Russell’s formula for definite descriptions which only picks out”8 whatever is the one and only one Φ, if there is any such.”9
The two uses of definite descriptions perceived by Donnellan are called the ‘attributive’ and ‘referential’ uses. These are defined thus:
“A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so. A speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion, on the other hand, uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about that person or thing.”10
Donnellan later notes that “With suitable changes the same difference in use can be formulated for uses of language other than assertions.”11
Donnellan argues for several conclusions in regard to the attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions:
In the first chapter, I outlined how Russell had maintained that in a sentence where a) nothing fits a description offered and b) this description is to be understood as a ‘primary occurrence’, then the proposition is false. Point iii) above contradicts Russell’s conclusion. The counter-example suggested by Donnellan is where the definite description is used referentially in the sentence ‘Smith’s murderer is insane.’ As Donnellan says:
“… where the definite description is simply a means of identifying the person we want to talk about, it is quite possible for the correct identification to be made even though no-one fits the description we used. We were speaking about Jones even though he is not in fact Smith’s murderer and, in the circumstances imagined, it was his behaviour we were commenting upon. Jones might, for example, accuse us of saying false things of him in calling him insane and it would be no defence, I should think, that our description, “the murderer of Smith,” failed to fit him.”17
The denoting phrase ‘Smith’s murderer’ can only have a primary occurrence in the sentence ‘Smith’s murderer is insane’, as the denoting phrase does not occur in a proposition which could be said to be a constituent of the main proposition. Russell had offered as the definition of ‘secondary occurrence’:
“A secondary occurrence of a denoting phrase may be defined as one in which the phrase occurs in a proposition p which is a mere constituent of the proposition we are considering.”18
In the example given by Donnellan, assuming that no one murdered Smith and assuming this is a primary occurrence, since it is not a secondary occurrence, then Russell would say the statement ‘Smith’s murderer is insane’ is false. Donnellan, however, says it may be true.
A possible response consistent with Russell’s analysis is to point out that the denoting phrase ‘Smith’s murderer’ in this example can be appropriately transformed by providing a predicate which, for example, names Jones or refers to the person in the stand or the person accused. That is, the proposition that ‘Jones is insane’ is what is claimed may be true in the circumstances outlined by Donnellan. Donnellan allows that such a substitution in a response to the original sentence is possible when he says
“… if the definite description is used referentially we can report the speaker as having attributed ψ to something. And we may refer to what the speaker referred to, using whatever description or name suits our purpose.”19
This, however, is not the same as saying that the sentence ‘Smith’s murderer is insane’ expresses the proposition that ‘Jones is insane’. This move I am suggesting is an attempt to describe what the sentence ‘Smith’s murderer is insane’ actually proposes or states. Donnellan’s purpose was merely to outline the responses which may be made to the sentence. Later Donnellan does attempt to identify the statement made. According to Donnellan, in order to say the statement made was that the murderer of Smith was insane
“… lands us in difficulties. For we have to decide whether in using the definite description here in the identification of the statement, we are using it attributively or referentially. If the former, then we misrepresent the linguistic performance of the speaker; if the latter, then we are ourselves referring to someone and reporting the speaker to have said something of that person, in which case we are back to the possibility that he did say something true or false of that person.”20
The compromise suggested above is still possible if it is claimed that what makes a statement capable of being either true or false is the proposition that it is attempting to express. In the example under discussion, the proposition is that there is one and only one individual and that, the individual is referred to by the expression ‘Smith’s murderer’ (in context, the accused man) and that individual is insane. Thus the contradiction, on this point, between the two authors may be averted. In other words, the counter-example proposed by Donnellan fails to do its job of contradicting Russell. It does show the artificiality of Russell’s substitute predicate which, depending on the circumstances, is permitted to contradict the description used in the denoting phrase.
Points ii) and iv) above indicate real practical differences between the approaches of Donnellan and Russell. Russell’s formal theory does not allow that where a definite description is used referentially
“…not only is there in some sense a presupposition or implication that someone or something fits the description, as there is also in the attributive use, but there is a quite different presupposition; the speaker presupposes of some particular someone or something that he or it fits the description.”21
Donnellan does not indicate how seriously he views this error of Russell’s theory. He does not indicate whether a theory which ignores this facet of language is an acceptable approximation for a formal theory or not. Furthermore, he does not suggest any formal theory which acknowledges this implication that one particular object, and not another, is referred to by any definite description used referentially. One suggestion would be to show how mistakes are, or could be, made if a formal theory which ignores this is followed. Donnellan’s point is only that Russell’s theory is not correct.
As I mentioned in the second paragraph, Donnellan is concerned with the uses of definite descriptions in their ‘natural’ setting — language. He speaks of statements whereas Russell talks about propositions. One consequence of this is noted in point iv) above. If it is true that we are talking about a human action, namely referring by use of language, then some consequences of human agency should also apply in this instance. Donnellan argues that the speaker’s beliefs cannot provide necessary and sufficient conditions for defining the referent of a definite description. He says
“Suppose the throne is occupied by a man I firmly believe to be not the king, but a usurper. Imagine also that his followers as firmly believe that he is the king. Suppose I wish to see this man. I might say to his minion, “Is the king in his countinghouse?” I succeed in referring to the man I wish to refer to without myself believing that he fits the description. It is not even necessary, moreover, to suppose that his followers believe him to be the king. If they are cynical about the whole thing, know he is not the king, I may still succeed in referring to the man I wish to refer to. Similarly, neither I nor the people I speak to may suppose that anyone is the king and, finally, each party may know that the other does not so suppose and yet the reference may go through.”22
Not only beliefs but also ‘intentions’, ‘results’, ‘morality’, ‘purposes’ and such fail, in general, to provide necessary and sufficient conditions to define human agency. Perhaps it would be a useful exercise to devise additional examples to show this general rule applies also in referring. But it may be the case that intentions are crucial to successfully refer, perhaps along the lines advocated for ‘meaning’ by H.P. Grice in his paper “Meaning”23, that is, referring is some function of intention.
Donnellan is loath to describe the difference in use between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions as a case of syntactical or semantic ambiguity:
“The grammatical structure of the sentence seems to me to be the same whether the description is used referentially or attributively: that is, it is not syntactically ambiguous. Nor does it seem at all attractive to suppose an ambiguity in the meaning of the words; it does not appear to be semantically ambiguous.”24
Instead he suggests that “Perhaps we could say that the sentence is pragmatically ambiguous: the distinction between roles that the description plays is a function of the speaker’s intentions.”25 Whatever label is used, Donnellan believes that not only are others at fault for failing to see this ambiguity but also this ambiguity
“… means that the view, for example, that sentences can be divided up into predicates, logical operators, and referring expressions is not generally true.”26
I am uncertain how to take this. “Predicates” and “referring expressions” are parts of sentences. However, all of these, and especially “logical operators”, make a group of terms used more readily in respect of formal schemes. If Donnellan is talking about propositions, not sentences, then is he suggesting that propositions are ambiguous (even if only pragmatically ambiguous)? A possible conclusion at this point is that we cannot suppose that the one sentence always expresses the same proposition if the sentence includes a definite description. The lesson, if there is one, is only that logicians must keep in mind the full context when ‘translating’ sentences containing definite descriptions into some symbolic form. A further step would be to argue that if a definite description is used without context then the sentence in which it appears cannot be so translated — or understood. I note that Russell introduced the sentence ‘The present King of France is bald’ without a context.
When a speaker uses a definite description attributively that use “might be said to occur essentially, for the speaker wishes to assert something about whatever or whoever fits the description.”27 Donnellan was concerned to show that
“… if nothing fits the description the linguistic purpose of the speech act will be thwarted. That is, the speaker will not succeed in saying something true, if he makes an assertion; he will not succeed in asking a question that can be answered, if he asked a question; he will not succeed in issuing an order that can be obeyed, if he has issued an order.”28
In the second paper I wish to discuss here, “Naming and Necessity”29, Saul Kripke looked at what could be said in any situation about an object. Initially Kripke restricts his discussion to proper names but notes later that similar comments are relevant to common names. He further restricted his comments to problems of making identity statements. A comment, however, that Kripke made about sentences containing supposed references to non-existent objects was that
“Perhaps according to me the truth should not be put in terms of saying that it is necessary that there be no unicorns, but just that we can’t say under what circumstances there would have been unicorns. Further, I think that even if archaeologists or geologists were to discover tomorrow some fossils conclusively showing the existence of animals in the past satisfying everything we know from the myth of the unicorn that would not show that there were unicorns.”30
His argument, spelt out in the Addenda31, is that insufficient data is given in the myth to determine a species and that such information is necessary for a claim that a species exists to be valid. Also there would be required from a discovery of unicorn-looking creatures a further discovery showing a connection between the newly discovered animal and the creature of the myth. This example summarises Kripke’s conclusions. Before an identity statement is possible a connection must be established. He suggests that ultimately this connection must extend to the initial use or baptism. A further contention is that this connection is assumed in ‘possible worlds’ arguments. Finally, some features must be regarded as essential in order that an individual or single species can be subsequently identified and imitations excluded.
Donnellan has pointed out that “referring is not the same as denoting”32 and gave an example where “the definite description used did denote Mr Goldwater (using Russell’s definition), the speaker used it attributively and did not refer to Mr Goldwater.”33 Kripke, for his purposes, chose to ignore this and “use(d) the term ‘referent of the description’ to mean the object uniquely satisfying the conditions in the definite description.”34 He goes on to point out that:
“This is the sense in which it’s been used in the logical tradition. So, if you have a description of the form ‘the x such that Φx,’ and there is exactly one x such that Φx, that is the referent of the description.”35
Kripke adds in Footnote 2, that Donnellan’s “remarks about reference have little to do with semantics or truth conditions, though they may be relevant to a theory of speech-acts.”36 He later comments in Footnote 37 that “a referential definite description, such as ‘the man drinking champagne’, is typically withdrawn when the speaker realises that it does not apply to its object.”37 This last comment at least is incorrect. The example of the bogus king in the countinghouse shows the possibility that no unintended mistake can occur and yet the object denoted is not the object referred to.
There is a difference between theories of meaning and theories of reference. When discussing a later development of the ideas seen in Russell’s paper “On Denoting”38, Kripke noted that:
“The difference between using this theory as a theory of meaning and using it as a theory of reference will come out a little more clearly later on. However, some of the attractiveness of the theory is lost if it isn’t supposed to give the meaning of the name.”39
Kripke makes a similar point about the difference between meaning the same (“be synonymous”) and successfully referring (“determining the reference”).
“There is no conflict between the counterfactual statement and the definition of ‘one meter’ as ‘the length of S at t0 because the ‘definition’, properly interpreted, does not say that the phrase ‘one meter’ is to be synonymous (even when talking about counterfactual situations) with the phrase ‘the length of S at t0 “but rather that we have determined the reference of the phrase ‘one meter’ by stipulating that ‘one meter’ is to be a rigid designator of the length which is in fact the length of S at t0.”40
Kripke introduces the term ‘designator’ in order “to cover names and descriptions”41 and defines a property of designators which he calls ‘rigidity’:
“Let’s call something a rigid designator if in any possible world it designates the same object, a non rigid or accidental designator if that is not the case.”42
He offered as an “intuitive thesis … that names are rigid designators”43 and further offered several examples of descriptions which he claimed were not rigid (‘The President of the U.S. in 1970’ — page 270; ‘the length of S at t0’ — page 275 and ‘the body in yonder position’ — page 276). As Donnellan pointed out definite descriptions, on occasions, operate more like names. Kripke himself pointed out that, for example, ‘the United Nations’ and ‘The Holy Roman Empire’ are not descriptions but names. Also Kripke gave one example, ‘God’, where this term could be seen as a name or as a description. Finally, Kripke adds in Footnote 16
“Of course I don’t imply that language contains a name for every object. Demonstratives can be used as rigid designators, and free variables can be used as rigid designators of unspecified objects.”44
If there is to be any weight given to determining that a term (phrase, demonstrative or free variable) is a rigid designator, and assuming that it is a reasonable generalization that names are rigid designators then some test is required to determine if a particular term (phrase, demonstrative or free variable) is being used as a name and hence as a rigid designator.
Kripke sets out to give “a picture which, if more details were to be filled in, might be refined so as to give more exact conditions for reference to take place.”45 He does this after criticising the views expressed by Russell and others. He suggests as follows:
“Someone, let’s say, a baby, is born; his parents call him by a certain name. They talk about him to their friends. Other people meet him. Through various sorts of talk the name is spread from link to link as if by chain. … A certain passage of communication reaching ultimately to the man himself does reach the speaker. He then is referring to Feynman even though he can’t identify him uniquely.”46
In this outline by Kripke it is not required that a user of a name (the speaker or audience) has to know any of the links in the chain; only that the user is a member “in a community which passed the name from link to link.”47 Kripke then introduces a counter-example, or at least a serious complication, for this outline:
“There may be a causal chain from our use of the term ‘Santa Claus’ to a certain historical saint, but still the children, when they use this, by this time probably do not refer to that saint.”48
This outline is an outline of a theory of reference. The speaker does refer to the right subject even when neither the speaker nor his audience is able to (uniquely) identify him. This is opposed to what Kripke calls, ‘the received view’ (which include Russell) which could be either a theory of reference or a theory of meaning. As indicated earlier Kripke believes that, intuitively, it is as a theory of meaning that the received view has its major appeal. I believe it is not unfair to conclude that Kripke’s theory of meaning is, following the lead of John Stuart Mill “that names have denotation but not connotation”49. He says of the critics of Mill that “Nevertheless, I think it’s pretty certain that the view of Frege and Russell is false.”50 In the paragraph prior to the paragraph where he introduced his own outline Kripke paraphrased the received view thus: “By ‘Gödel’ I shall mean the man, whoever he is, who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic”51 (my emphasis). There is the suggestion here that identifying someone is a different operation to referring to that person.
There appears to be either some confusion at a different (metaphysical) level or else at the metaphysical level the difference between referring and identifying is reduced. The connection appears to be Kripke’s notion of a rigid designator. Kripke argues that the origin of someone is essential for any counterfactual story to be about that same person.
“Perhaps in some possible world Mr and Mrs Truman even had a child who actually became the Queen of England and was even passed off as the child of other parents. This would not be the situation in which this very woman whom we call Elizabeth the Second was the child of Mr and Mrs Truman.”52
Names are rigid designators picking out the same object in any possible world. To complete the picture, names refer via a communication chain in a community going back to an essential property of that object — its origin. Thus the object referred to by name is, supposedly, correctly identified. The argument appears to be:—
Proposition A and C are claimed to be intuitively obvious and so these and the above argument are evidence for the truth of B, Kripke’s (embryonic) theory of reference.
Theories, like Russell’s, cannot separate meaning, referring and identifying, because successful referring is a function of an identification of the referent by use of the meaning of the term(s) used. Kripke, however, could have achieved this separation. He could have had his metaphysics — claiming that origin is essential and say no more than that successful referring occurs “in virtue of our connection with other speakers in the community.”53 After all, his ‘Santa Claus’ example showed something wrong with totally insisting that the communication chain reaches to the original baptism. Elsewhere he also said that
“… although the man (Nixon) might not have been the President, it is not the case that he might not have been Nixon (though he may not have been called Nixon)”54
and
“It matters not at all that different speakers may fix the reference of the name in different ways, provided that they give it the same referent.”55
Referring does not depend on a connection with the object’s origin. Rarely will an object originate from a baptism nor even will the two events be contemporaneous. Most people have been referred to many times before they are named. The name used is not essential — calling names ‘rigid designators’ only points out that (usually) in discussing possibilities we call the same thing by the same name. This will not be the case when we make an identity claim referring to the same object by different names.
If Kripke wishes to maintain that somehow a chain back to an origin is important or crucial (because he lacks a sophisticated theory of meaning compared to the received view) and remains unconvinced by his own counter-example then there is another factor to be considered when looking at natural kinds. Even assuming Kripke is correct that natural kinds possess essential properties and these essential properties have a role to play when natural kinds are identified and deviants rejected, a communication chain going back to the initial baptism of a natural kind is not a palatable notion. Kripke maintains that
“The original concept of cat is: that kind of thing, where the kind can be identified by paradigmatic instances.”56
and
“If we imagine a hypothetical (admittedly somewhat artificial) baptism of the substance, we must imagine it picked out as by some such ‘definition’ as ‘Gold is the substance instantiated by the items over there, or at any rate, by almost all of them’.”57
An intuitive response to this “admittedly somewhat artificial” thesis is that perhaps it is more than artificial, perhaps it is somewhat absurd. There may be cases where individuals learned the meaning of particular natural kind terms by an ostensive definition or other definition, but this is a long way from suggesting that the creation of nouns in a language was by a baptism ceremony. Again, as for names, the metaphysical/epistemological vindication for his theory of reference looks like a theory of meaning. In the quotes above appear such words as “original concept”, “identified” and “definition”.
Kripke in the article under discussion, where he was primarily concerned with identity statements, lists as one type of identity statement some assertions from scientists. Kripke talks of
“… theoretical identifications, such as light and stream of photons, or water and a certain compound of hydrogen and oxygen. These are all contingent identities.”58
Firstly it is important to note that identifying something is not the same as claiming an identity exists. Later he makes the same claim in respect of what he believes is identical with water.
“Let’s consider how this applies to the types of identity statements expressing scientific discoveries that I talked about before — say that water is H20.”59
‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is clearly a scientifically discovered identity statement. If the first assertion about water is to be read as a non-technical statement it is a statement about the components of water, and listing components is not a case of asserting an identity. If this first statement is to be read assuming the full scientific background, then it is more than the truth of this statement which depends on this background the meaning itself of the assertion relies on the acceptance of the background. The declaration that ‘Heat is phlogiston’ is not so much a false scientific statement but that the declaration is no longer made. While I do not wish to push this point, whatever is happening to abandoned scientific identity claims, it does not seem to fit Kripke’ s belief that these are contingent; necessary statements. I would have thought a contingent necessary statement once discovered could not suffer this fate.
Another problem is that ‘Water is H20’ and the first assertion, if read as a scientific claim, is only an approximation. Briefly, theoretically pure water is a mixture of this compound, hydronium ions (H30+) and hydroxyl ions (OH—) all in equilibrium. Furthermore, although Kripke allowed the odd impurity in naming natural kinds, did Kripke envisage that the impurity may be, in practice, impossible to eliminate? The deviants could not be recognised. (This is because of the high solubility of water.) ‘Ice is water’ may be an example of a scientifically discovered identity statement. A simpler example showing that scientists are not really in the business of discovering identities occurs with Carbon (C). Diamond is C and so is graphite. A simple substitution turns graphite into diamond.
In the discussion of the papers by Russell, Donnellan and Kripke several terms were highlighted — ‘meaning’, referring’, ‘identifying’, ‘denotation’ and ‘connotation’ — and an attempt will be made in this chapter to show their interrelationships. Initially I shall restrict my use of the verb ‘to refer’ to pick out the right object which is being talked about. This will be only in those cases that a name, term or description is used referentially. Donnellan had defined this use for definite descriptions. A speaker
“uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about.”1
The important characteristic of this use of the verb ‘to refer’ is that
‘there is a right thing to be picked out by the audience and its being the right thing is not simply a function of its fitting the description.’2
I shall use the verb ‘to denote’ to identify whatever or whoever fits the description. If a name can be said to denote, then I shall say that the name denotes whatever or whoever is called by that name. Finally, I will borrow Kripke’s expression ‘designator’ —
“If we want a common term to cover names and descriptions, we may use the term ‘designator’.”3
Donnellan looked at several interpretations of the sentence ‘Smith’s murderer is insane’. No matter what story is told the phrase ‘Smith’s murderer’ always denotes whoever murdered Smith. The phrase may refer to others as in Donnellan’s example of referring to Jones who had been placed on trial. Donnellan has shown that sentences do not behave as one would expect of a more formal scheme. The same sentence can be used to mean different things in different contexts. The different propositions which each sentence may make can occur from differences in the role played by the designators appearing in that sentence. Donnellan showed this for definite descriptions and I shall indicate to what extent that this is true for all designators. The same designator can be used to refer to anything. Of course it is also possible to use predicates, logical constants and grammatical rules differently in any given context. When this occurs, the different uses of these predicates, logical constants or grammatical rules cannot be described as differences within a language. It cannot be said that the same language is being spoken. Take for example the predicate ‘is red’. This predicate has a range of meanings but if it were used to mean ‘is late’ then this is outside the use allowed in this language. This is not true in Donnellan’s example of calling Jones in the witness stand ‘Smith’s murderer’. Differences in the object referred to by the same designator or the difference between using the designator referentially or attributively cannot be described as a difference in the language spoken. There is therefore a fundamental difference between on the one hand the subject of a sentence (or any designator) and other grammatical structures such as the predicate, logical constants or the rules of construction. Russell had attempted to reduce denoting phrases to some function of predicates but this conflicts with this distinction where designators may refer to anything but predicates are restricted to a limited set of meanings. There is a way that designators could be said to be outside language. The expression ‘round square’ could be used to refer to something but the expression denotes nothing, and no designator could be used to refer to round squares. They are outside any language because we cannot talk about them, explain to others what we mean by this designation or imagine anything at all about round squares.
The important element of Donnellan’s referential use of definite descriptions was that the right object be picked out. There is implied in this use that the object referred to exists but also, true to the maxim ‘Success by any means’, it is not necessary that the right description be used. The right description means that the object referred to is the one and only one object denoted by the description. As I noted before, Kripke ignored the distinction between the two uses and presumably would ignore the difference between referring and denoting. Kripke argued that
Pragmatic ambiguities and implications are of interest so that even if Donnellan is correct in describing the difference in the two types of uses of designators as a case of pragmatic ambiguity this only means that there will be no logical relationship between the two. The story of the bogus king in his countinghouse shows that referring can occur when the description is wrong but unlike the claim made by Kripke in point b) the description will not be withdrawn. Indeed, in this story, it is pointless even to suggest a retraction. The second point may be valid if both meaning (and hence denoting) and referring are functions of the speaker’s intentions. The first was argued by H. P. Grice in his paper “Meaning”.5 The bogus king example does not rule out that referring is a function of intentions. Donnellan suggested that “the distinction between roles that the description plays is a function of the speaker’s intentions”.6 Whatever the merits of arguing that intentions provide at least necessary conditions for successful referring this is not the case for meanings. One article challenging Grice’s views is “Grice on Meaning: The Ultimate Counter-Example”7 by Neil Wilson. As the attributive uses relies on the meaning of the description and the referential use on the speaker successfully referring, and as I believe these operations are distinct, then there is no substance in Kripke’s claim that there is no difference, practical or otherwise, between the two uses described by Donnellan.
A simple rewrite of one of Donnellan’s examples is sufficient to show that names and indefinite descriptions are used similarly to Donnellan’s referential use of a definite description:
“Suppose the throne is occupied by a man I firmly believe to be not the king [Jones, an aristocrat], but an usurper [Smith, a commoner]. Imagine also that his followers as firmly believe that he is the king [Jones, an aristocrat]. Suppose I wish to see this man [see Smith, ingratiate myself]. I might say to his minions, “Is the king in his countinghouse?” [Is Jones in his countinghouse?”, “Are not aristocrats fine people?”] I succeed in referring to the man I wish to refer to without myself believing he fits the description.”8
This exercise can be continued showing that names and indefinite descriptions may succeed in referring when everyone knows that the name is not right or the description does not fit — or that anyone is so named or so described.
Donnellan’s analysis of the attributive use of definite descriptions was that the meaning of the description is critical, and that whoever or whatever may fit this description is a peripheral question. (There is an implication that someone or something does exist who fits this description.) An example of a name used attributively would be the request ‘Would Mr Jones come forward’ said to a group when the speaker wants someone, anyone, named Jones. Someone of another name would not do and if there is no one names Jones, the request cannot be met. The same is true of indefinite descriptions. ‘Is there a doctor in the house?’ is (usually) used attributively. Unless the circumstances are a little odd one could expect that an indefinite description could only be used attributively since, being indefinite, these descriptions do not mean that one and only one particular object is the right object. This cannot be absolute. If a designator is used referentially it need not satisfy the description used, including the connotation implied in the indefinite article. I presume that terms for natural (and unnatural) substances and kinds are also used attributively unless referring to the class or species itself. Names can have connotations. The sex, ethnic origin or the natural kind may be indicated by the name used. As well, titles may show deference or the place in the social hierarchy. These connotations may be relevant if the name is used attributively. If the request ‘Would Mr Jones come forward?’ is said to an apparently female audience a male in the audience may answer ‘My name is not Jones, however if any male will do I’ll come.’ Finally names are used attributively to denote anyone — Tom, Dick or Harry — or the average — Mr Jones.
In the preceding paragraphs I assumed that using the correct name was like fitting the description or satisfying the conditions of the description. If as I have suggested, names may be used attributively then they must be said to denote. I can see no problem in ignoring this different sense of the verb ‘to denote’. There is a problem in the causal role denoting must play in the attributive use of designators. For the use to be successful the description must fit or the name be right. A question remains as to what latitude, if any, is allowed. Earlier I noted the difficulties that Russell’s substitute predicate must face. The same difficulties exist here. Names or descriptions, including all their associated connotations and presumptions, may not be totally correct each time they are used attributively. This does not mean that their use will fail. An appreciation of the circumstances in which the designator is used is needed to understand just what is being denoted each time any designator is used attributively.
The context in which a sentence appears is required before it can be decided whether
From what has been said so far there need be no changes in the way propositions are symbolised. I have disagreed with Russell taking the notion of a variable as fundamental and attempting to determine the notion of a particular from an analysis of variables. I believe that it is necessary to retain symbols for names or any designator used referentially. On the other hand what was seen to be crucial to the attributive use of designators was being correctly named, identified or described. The introduction of variables ‘for all …’ and ‘some …’ is necessary to avoid the implication that a particular object is intended. This implication does not occur when a designator is used attributively. The designator may be transformed using a variable and a predicate as suggested by Russell or by a variable and a relation ‘is a member of’, ‘is a part of’, ‘is a type of’, ‘is a bit of’ and so on where appropriate. As the objective of Russell to eliminate all denoting expressions has been disregarded it is not necessary to insist that a predicate be used and not anything involving another denoting expression. In view of my comments above where a name is used attributively, then a suitable predicate could be ‘is named …’. The sentence ‘I met Mr Jones’ following Russell’s lead — may be understood as
‘“I met x, and x is named Jones” is not always false.’
(Suggesting that the sentence means that I met someone named Jones).
‘“I met x, and x is an untitled, adult male named Jones” is not always false.’
(Presuming the full connotations of ‘Mr’ is intended.) or
‘“I met x” is not always false.’
This last could cover the situation where someone was questioned concerning what that person had done that morning. The reply is informative insofar as saying the person met someone but he is not saying who that was. It could have been that the person met was a stranger unknown to both speaker and audience and here referred to as “Mr Jones”. This, however, would be referential not an attributive use of the name.
Initially, I suggested using the verbs ‘to refer’ and ‘to denote’ in senses similar to those noted by Donnellan for definite descriptions. The Concise Oxford Dictionary defines ‘denote’ as
“v.t. Mark out, distinguish, be the sign of: give to understand, (esp. that —clause); stand as name for (Log) be a name for, be predicated of”9
The dictionary does not list as a meaning of the verb ‘to refer’ as something synonymous with ‘to pick out’. ‘Refer’ is defined as insinuating something from what had previously been said or as passing on a matter to another. Perhaps the closest word fitting the way that I have used the verb, that is, to pick out or to indicate a particular object, would be the verb ‘to mean’. Ordinary usage of the verb ‘to refer’ has the connotation that something special is indicated; as in the sense that something is being insinuated or when matters are referred it is usually special matters, or detailed problems which are passed to an adjudicator or higher authority. Russell believed there existed some confusion between ‘meaning’ and ‘denotation’. One sense of ‘meaning’ would be referring as I am using the word. The dictionary gives as the meaning of ‘denotation’
“n. Denoting; expression by marks or symbols; sign, indication; designation; meaning of a term; (Log.) aggregate of objects that may be included under a word (cf. CONNOTATION), extension.”10
If we expressly ignore the Logician’s understanding of this word (which is perhaps implied in the ordinary meaning) then ‘denotation’ and ‘to denote’ are consistent with the tentative definition given earlier. Again the word ‘meaning’ is a synonym of ‘denotation’ which would suggest that Russell exploited the ambiguity in the word ‘meaning’ to create his confusion. This is also suggested by the fact that Russell failed to recognise the distinction between the different uses of designators labelled by Donnellan as the attributive and referential uses. Finally the word ‘referent’ is not in common usage but I believe that for these purposes the ‘referent’ means that object referred to. Kripke uses the expression
“… ‘referent of the description’ to mean the object uniquely satisfying the conditions in the definite description.”11
Donnellan had said
“If there is anything which might be identified as reference here, it is reference in a very weak sense — namely, reference to whatever is the one and only one and only one Φ if there is any such.”12
There are two concepts involved — the denotation or meaning of the designator and the object designated. As there are two senses that the designator may have, then this means that four terms would be helpful. Both ‘denotation’ and ‘referent’ appear to be ambiguous. Earlier I suggested not using the word ‘denotation’ to mean the object denoted but it is still ambiguous. The denotation of an attributively used designator is essential to the meaning of the designator, whereas it is not essential to the meaning of the referentially used designator. Kripke had used the word ‘referent’ to mean the object denoted and Donnellan allowed this use (in a weaker sense) for the word ‘reference’. This is the object denoted by an attributively used designator. The referent may also mean the object referred to by a referentially used designator. I believe ordinary usage would say that a referentially used designator denotes, as the designator used has a meaning or uses a name independent of the intentions of the speaker. (The object(s) denoted need not be the referent.) For this reason, I will not dictate on the ambiguity in ‘denote’ or ‘denotation’. However, I suggest not using the word ‘referent’ to mean the object denoted by an attributively used designator.
Russell had said that
“… the relation of meaning and denotation is not merely linguistic through the phrase: there must be a logical relation involved, which we express by saying that the meaning denotes the denotation.”13
The expression “the meaning denotes the denotation” could be ‘what is meant marks out (distinguishes, stands as name for) the expression (sign, indication, designation, meaning of the term)’ or, using the logician’s interpretation; ‘what is meant is a name for (is predicated of) the aggregate of objects that may be included under the word (the extension)’. Other combinations are possible alternating the ordinary and Logical meanings for ‘denotes’ and ‘the denotation’. In whatever mix, sing the usual meaning of ‘denotation’ seems wrong: ‘the meaning distinguishes, or is the name for, the expression or meaning of the term’ appears nonsense. I take it then that the logical relation that Russell was talking about was that the meaning marks out the extension.
I have suggested using ‘denote’ and ‘denotation’ for both the referential and attributive modes but not use ‘denotation’ to mean the object, only the descriptive content of the designator. This is opposite to the meaning of ‘denotation’ in Russell’s formula “the meaning denotes the denotation”. Russell gave two examples:
“The centre of mass of the Solar System is a point, not a denoting complex;
‘The centre of mass of the Solar System’ is a denoting complex, not a point.
Or again,
The first line of Gray’s Elegy states a proposition.
‘The first line of Gray’s Elegy’ does not state a proposition.”14
What then is the difference between the two phrases, one without the inverted commas and the other using these commas? When the phrase occurs without inverted commas it is the referent or the object(s) denoted we are talking about — depending on the sense in which the phrase is used. When the phrase occurs between inverted commas it is the denotation we are talking about. Russell had termed the first ‘the denotation’ and the second ‘the meaning’. This is acceptable if ‘denotation’ is used to mean either the object(s) denoted or the referent, however I believe the former to be ill-advised and the latter incorrect. The expression ‘the meaning of the phrase’ can be used for all four notions — the content of the expression and the designated object in either mode. There is ample opportunity for confusion and this was exploited by Russell.
“But the difficulty that confronts us is that we cannot succeed in both preserving the connection of meaning and denotation and preventing them from being one and the same.”15
As I have described designating, the above examples show that objects denoted or referents can be points or state propositions; but denotations are denoting complexes and not something which can be said to state a proposition. Whatever is said to be true is said about the object denoted (if the designator is used attributively) or the referent. It is not true of the denotation even though the denotation has a role to play in designating. If the designator is used attributively, then there is an essential relation between the object denoted and the denotation. This object is presumed to exist but primarily this object must satisfy the conditions of the designator. This condition may be important as Russell had noted
“The proposition ‘Scott was the author of Waverley has a property not possessed by ‘Scott was Scott’, namely the property that George IV wished to know whether it was true.”16
It is possible to distinguish between three types of implications. The first arise strictly from the proposition expressed by any sentence. I believe these to be called semantic and to be the subject matter of Logic. The second type of implication relevant to sentences is those relating to the circumstances in which the sentences appear. Donnellan had called the difference in use of definite descriptions a “pragmatic ambiguity”. The implications here arise from the context in which the sentence appears. As well, other features such as who is the referent or what counts in the designator to identify the object denoted are related to the context. I presume these to be pragmatic. Finally there are implications arising from the sentence as a speech act. In all these we talk about what we must mean but the “must” is different in each case. Before an attempt is to be made to review the puzzles of Russell it will be necessary to see what sort of implication occurs in each puzzle in order to approach the problem at this level. There is some overlap in the three types of implications and the interplay may require some spelling out. An example where semantic implications are not necessarily relevant to speech acts is in Epistemology. The evidence for a reasonable knowledge claim may have nothing to do with what is strictly implied by that claim. It might be argued that the implication that the referent or the denoted object (when the designator is used attributively) exists may be any of the three types. Where the designator is used referentially this is more suggestive of human agency and as the speaker’s intentions appear to be a necessary component in the identification of the referent it would not be too amiss to propose that the presumption that the referent exists arises from the act of referring. I will give two considerations for not taking this step.
Some speech acts do not assume that an object exists for each designator. Donnellan gave the example of the question “Is de Gaulle the King of France?”
“This is the natural form of words for a person to use who is in doubt as to whether de Gaulle is king or president of France. Given this background to the question, there seems to be no presumption or implication that someone is the king of France.”1
The “or” in “king or president of France” appears to be exclusive and any statement of this question or doubt does not imply that something is true both of the king of France and of the president of France. That is, the lack of any presumption that an object exists corresponding to the use of the designator ‘the king of France’ in this speech act has its parallel in the ‘proposition’ implied by this speech act. Presumably if a proposition does not necessarily propose something about all designators in the proposition, as in the above example of an exclusive disjunction, it is not valid to conclude that all designators imply that a corresponding individual exists. This will be true only of those designators about which something is said. This example of Donnellan’s does not prove that an analysis of propositions is unable to explain the existential assumptions that appear in some language use. Secondly a consistent approach in an analysis of these assumptions is preferable to a different argument being given for the two senses in which designators may be used. If a designator is used attributively then the object denoted is presumed to exist. If the designator is used referentially the object denoted is usually the referent which is presumed to exist. The presumption then is that the object denoted exists. The relation between the denoted object and the sentence is through the denotation of the designator and not through the speaker’s actions. It is unlikely that a theory of speech acts will explain this relation.
If the setting is unknown then what is stated by any sentence will be uncertain. As I outlined the importance of the context in the last chapter it is clear that the ‘pragmatics’, the presuppositions needed to make sense of the sentence, are prior to the ‘semantics’. The proposition is either a subject-predicate form or a variable and predicate form depending on the sense of the designator. The referent will always be a singular name and may be symbolised accordingly. The formula involved symbolising an attributively used designator will vary. Russell gave two examples of the substitute predicate he intended; ‘a man’ becomes ‘x is human’ and ‘a father of Charles II’ becomes ‘x begat Charles II’. A general formula for these designators will need to encapsulate this and as well the notions of ‘being a member of’, ‘is a kind of’, ‘is a ‘piece of’ and ‘is a bit of’. ‘Being human’ may be passable as a predicate for ‘a man’ but there is no comparable expression for ‘sharks’ and ‘gremlins’. While this may not be a serious problem it is unnecessary to insist as Russell did that all denoting phrases be eliminated (since this cannot be done).
The denotation of the designator may be ambiguous. This could affect the substitute predicate used or the quantification. There is a difference for example in the quantification of the designator ‘sharks’ in the sentences ‘Sharks are cartilaginous fish’ and ‘Sharks appeared on Earth a long time ago’. Donnellan had noted that the users of a definite description may have false beliefs about the object denoted when the definite description is being used attributively. The denoted object may not satisfy all the conditions in the denotation and this may include the condition implied by the definite article (which Russell took pains to formulate). Imagine a situation a little different from one of Donnellan’s examples. A speaker claims that the future Labor candidate in a particular seat, which is considered safe for the Country Party, will be a farmer. Following Donnellan’s example this political analyst need not know who will be the Labor candidate. Imagine further that two candidates are pre-selected in order to take advantage of the preferential system of voting to succeed in having the Liberal candidate elected on preferences rather than the more highly favoured Country Party candidate. For the reasons known and expounded by our political analyst, both Labor candidates are farmers. Following Donnellan’s advice I do not suggest that the speaker’s description ‘the Labor candidate’ can be said to refer to both candidates. The speaker may claim that he was vindicated when two farmers won pre-selection and then the description ‘the Labor candidate’ denoted two persons. Russel’s suggestion for transforming sentences containing definite descriptions which appear without any context is not valid. This prejudges an issue to be decided from the context just as his presumption that the phrase ‘a man’ should be transformed to ‘is human’.
Semantics deals with propositions but to know what is proposed by any sentence requires a fuller story. Imagine if history wa s a little different and Scott used the pseudonym ‘Jones’ and in disguise appeared in public as Jones. When George IV wished to know if Scott was the author of Waverley the monarch could have been using the denoting phrase referentially — meaning Jones. Perhaps in another rewrite of history a person named Jones appeared in public claiming to be the author of Waverley. George IV’s inquiry could then have several interpretations. If by the phrase ‘the author of Waverley’, George IV was inquiring if Scott was Jones (in disguise?), then the answer is no. The question could have been to ascertain if Scott, rather then Jones, authored Waverley or to find out if Scott was the person generally known as the author of Waverley either because George IV did not know this other man’s name; thought this man’s name was also Scott or wished to test if others knew the real author. If the denoting phrase is used attributively then Russell’s suggestion that the proposition ‘Scott was the author of Waverley is not an identity statement between two singular names, is correct. The question of a substitution does not arise. If, however, the phrase is used referentially, then the above stories give content to this inquiry other than the suggestion that the question on the monarch’s mind concerned the law of identity.
To answer Russell’s second and third puzzles it is necessary to correctly determine the type of implication involved in saying that the bearer of a designator, about which something has been stated, exists. Russell has indicated the need to correctly define the scope of any denial. Of course this avoids a conflict with the law of excluded middle only if the designator is used attributively. On this analysis the assumption that the denoted object exists is part of the semantics of the sentence. Some import is made of the use of a conjunction translating the single expression — there is an x and x is (substitute predicate). (There is a further conjunct if the designator is definite.) However, unless a different story is told for referentially used designators .it, must be assumed that all referents exist. However, when we wish to say that unicorns have one horn; that Macbeth was evil or that the March Hare was impatient, we cannot do so even by understanding these designators in the attributive sense. A further qualification is required, for example, Russell’s primary and secondary occurrences. Finally, when something is said not to exist the designator will usually be used to refer to whatever was claimed earlier even when that was introduced by a designator used attributively. To say about something (attributive use) that it does not exist appears nonsense.
The assumption that the referent or the denoted object (attributive sense only) exists appears a question for pragmatics. Something is assumed to exist within a context that includes that sentence which includes a designator. It may be a suitable approximation for a formal theory to incorporate this assumption in its grammar. And consequently it will be acceptable to continue symbolising attributively used designators by a variable and a substitute predicate. There will be various rules for reading sentences. Unless there is some device indicating that part of a sentence is to be read differently from the rest it could be assumed that the total environment of each part is the same. The sentence ‘Unicorns have one horn and do not exist’ has no indicator of a change in the universe of discourse of each of the two predicates. They cannot form parts of the same proposition if the proposition is understood as implying that something predicated exists. The sentence ‘Unicorns are mythical creatures with a horse’s body and single horn’ does make sense. The sentence is not to be understood as saying that there are creatures in this world which are mythical, have one horn and horse’s body. To do so misunderstands the word ‘mythical’. The sentence is to be understood as saying that the context is a myth in which the conjunction of being like a horse and having a single horn is predicated of creatures called (referred to as) ‘unicorns’. The conjunction which appears in this sentence poses no problems.
Limitations to the universe of discourse have been noted before. Russell has shown that to allow an unrestricted universe of discourse cannot escape contradiction. We cannot talk about the set of all things that are not members of themselves. Such a set is contradictory as this set is both a member and not a member of itself. If it is a member of this set then it is not, a member of itself. If it is not a member of this set then by not being a member of itself it is a member of this set. The limitation that I am suggesting is similar, insofar as its limits what can be said. A formal contradiction will only occur if a premise is added to the effect that whatever is spoken about exists. The limitation I suggest is that some context is required in which the object designated is presumed to exist before a sentence can be understood (a proposition formulated) which predicates something about that referent or denoted object. The sentence ‘Inertia is red’ can only be true and can only be understood if a story is told. Otherwise the context will be assumed to be not unusual and the sentence meaningless. An explanation such as “‘Inertia” is the name of an old car’ is sufficient to make the sentence meaningful. It may still be wrong. Usually details of fictitious or mythical names need not be supplied as the audience is aware of their use. This is not true of ‘the present King of France’ who is only known to philosophers. There are certain linguistic clues noting a change of context — ‘once upon a time’, ‘imagine the case that’, ‘if it were true that’ and so on. To understand these is similar to using the adjective ‘mythical’ previously mentioned. Donnellan had written
“There is finally the case in which there is nothing at all where I thought there was a man with a walking stick; and perhaps here we have a genuine failure to refer at all, even though the description was used for the purpose of referring. There is no rock nor anything else to which I meant to refer; it was, perhaps, a trick of light that made me think there was a man there … Now perhaps also in such cases, if the speaker has asserted something, he fails to state anything true or false if there is nothing that can be identified as that to which he referred.”2
One important indicator of a change in context is the verb ‘to exist’. To say that something exists or does not exist requires that another context is understood to apply where something is predicated of this object which is claimed to exist or not exist. Otherwise the claim is either pointless or self contradictory. Russell’s comments about the scope of the denial in saying “It is false that ‘The present King of France is bald.’” are a little misplaced. If the denial is to be understood as qualifying the claim that something exists (who reigns over France), then this presumes that the existential implication is a question for semantics. More correctly, I believe, that if the scope of the denial is allowed such a range, then it must be understood as implying a change of context. Just as the claim that the designated object does or does not exist implies a change of context. This is a consequent of formulating the proposition as strictly implying that the subject exists. The sentence ‘de Gaulle is not the present King of France’ does not assume that anyone is. If asked who is the king, it is correct to respond ‘No one’. If, however, the sentence is ‘There is no king of France’ or ‘The present King of France does not exist’ and someone asks who or what are you talking about it is not an answer to reply ‘Nothing’. Perhaps it would be all right to say the bald king of France in Russell’s puzzle but this was only postulated.
If the phrase ‘the present king of France’ is used referentially then there will be no complications for the law of excluded middle. Assuming that a person is referred to, that person will not be the present King of France but his head will be available for inspection. The express ion ‘the difference between A and B’ is meaningful if there is a situation where A differs from B. In any particular problem it is only a question of the truth of any proposition where this proposition talks about the difference between A and B. If the values of A and B change so that at a point in time they are equal this does not make a proposition about the difference between A and B meaningless. It is perhaps pointless and meaningless to talk about the difference between A and B if in the particular problem being investigated, A and B are always equal.
Hopefully I have not peopled the universe with strange Meinong-like creatures, only with lots of stories with sentences proposing anything that the author may imagine. We cannot talk about nonsense such as ‘square circles’ because we cannot imagine anything about them. Similarly we cannot talk about something about which nothing has been predicated, such as Russell’s example of the present King of France. We can of course make our own story about these.
I would like to tell a story about three things. There are two people, James and Judy. James plays in the local cricket team but Judy is an ardent marathon runner. They meet at the start of the town’s annual fun-run, eventually move in together and live happily ever after. Many things were mentioned — ‘the local cricket team’, ‘marathons’, ‘the town’ and ‘fun-run’. This story, however is about two people not three things.
Saul Kripke in his paper Naming and Necessity had attempted to give some content to the notion of ‘identifying’. If both designators in an identity statement are used attributively, then no further comment will be required beyond a general theory of meaning. This will be true even when both designators are names, as in ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, as long as these occur attributively. An understanding of these identity statements entails only an understanding of a predicate appropriate to the denotation of each designator. In the case of proper names this means only an aptitude and skill in using the verb ‘to name’. I do not wish to imply that working out a theory of meaning is an easy exercise, only that nothing more need be said about identifying the object denoted. A theory of reference is required to show how the referent is identified. Kripke’s causal theory or “better picture” will be relevant here and I presume this was his intention.
In his outline of how designators are successfully identified, Kripke introduced and used a notion he called ‘rigid designation’. Although Kripke rejected Donnellan’s distinction between attributive and referential uses of designators, ‘rigid designation’ and his causal theory can relate only to designators used referentially. A rigid designator picks out the same entity in any story, “if in any possible world it designates the same object”1. Presumably then, there is a right or particular object to be referred to, and presumably this will be independent of the denotation of the designator. When talking about a rigid designator he contrasts “reference” and “being synonymous” —
“… the definition of ‘one meter’ as ‘the length of S at t0’ … properly interpreted, does not say that the phrase ‘one meter’ is to be synonymous (even when talking about counterfactual situations) with the phrase ‘the length of S at t0’ but rather that we have determined the reference of the phrase ‘one meter’ by stipulating that ‘one meter’ is to be a rigid designator of the length which is in fact the length of S at t0.”2
Kripke’s causal theory is an attempt to explain how we can refer to someone even though we cannot identify that person. “He then is referring to Feynman even though he can’t identify him uniquely.”3 A definite description will identify completely when used attributively. There is no need to stipulate further as it is expected that the object denoted will satisfy the details of the denotation. The object denoted is whatever does so.
Kripke’s rigid designators need some explanation as to how they may successfully refer as they are not synonymous with a description. The causal theory attempts this. A name may be used attributively and it is possible, in the case of a popular or famous person, an appropriate description may be understood as being the denotation of that name. In these circumstances the description theorist appears to be correct though I would add that one description or a group of descriptions will not always be synonymous with the use of this name. When a name is used attributively, just as for any designator, the context in which the name appears must be consulted prior to deciding what substitute predicate is to be understood. In general, names are not shorthand for descriptions and, possibly, rarely used to denote someone so named as opposed to intending one particular person. If this is so and my suggestion that rigid designators are only those used referentially is correct, then Kripke’s generalization that names are rigid designators is acceptable. His theory explaining successful referring is not. The emphasis on the fact that names are used in talk amongst a community is valid. The role of an initial baptism is just not believable. (See for example Paul Ziff’s article “About Proper Names”.4) The approach made by Kripke not only attempted to demonstrate how a referent is identified, it also as one result, shows how the same name is used for the same individual on a continuing basis.
So far I have emphasised the difference between subjects and predicates. Designators used referentially have no internal logical structure. A dictionary imposes a regime on the range of meanings that any word may have while still being the same word. This is not true of names and the “Who’s Who” does not operate as a dictionary for names. Names, unlike other words, have no meaning and only function in a sentence, although names may have certain connotations. That is all very well but as a rule each individual has one name and by that name we mean that individual, somewhat as other words are used. The intentions of a speaker are not relevant for determining what name an individual has, only in those cases when a person is deciding what name an individual will have. Learning to use an individual’s name would appear to be not materially different from learning to use other words. Any theory of reference, however, exploiting this aspect of the use of names is doomed to failure and therefore a philosophy of language must account for successful referring. I would claim that getting a name right is distinct from successful referring — to repeat, the object(s) denoted by a designator used referentially need not be the referent. Perhaps, to use an analogy, getting a name or description right is like pronouncing a word correctly — that word means the same if mispronounced — and there is no problem if the word is still recognisable. Similarly, it does not matter what designation is used to refer only that the referent be recognisable.
From what I have said it can be presumed that I would be unsympathetic to a philosophy of language that pictured the world as being supplied with tags, one for each thing, and we learn a language by learning the tags.
“Augustine, in describing his learning of language, says that he was taught to speak by learning the names of things. It is clear that whoever says this has in mind the way in which a child learns such words as “man”, “sugar”, “table”, etc. He does not primarily think of such words as “today”, “not”, “but”, “perhaps”. In this sense we can say that Augustine’s description of learning the language was correct for a simpler language than ours. Imagine this language: —
1) Its function is the communication between a builder A and his man B. B has to reach A building stones. There are cubes, bricks, slabs, beams, columns. The language consists of the words “cube”, “brick”, “slab”, “column”. A calls out one of these words, upon which B brings a stone of a certain shape. Let us imagine a society in which this is the only system of language.”5
The picture behind both Augustine’s and Wittgenstein’s comments is not inconsistent with the fact that names have no syntax and that we use one word for each thing as though they came with tags. I believe this picture of language to be false.
Designators appear within sentences. They are subject to the usual checks and responses open to any part of a sentence. These responses show the use of the words in the sentence in other contexts and this aspect indicates that language is being used, and shows what it means to say that the sentence makes sense. If nothing more can be said, as in the imagined language of Wittgenstein, then this is not really language and the sounds, however well ordered, cannot be said to make sense. This is consistent with the comments made about the sentence ‘The present King of France is bald’ and what it means to say that something does or does not exist. Rush Rhees makes these points in his article “Wittgenstein’s Builders”.
“You might ask why this should make such a difference — the fact that they are used elsewhere. And one reason is that then the expressions are not just part of one particular routine. Their uses elsewhere have to do with the point or bearing of them in what we are saying now. It is the way in which we have come to know them in other connections that decides whether it makes sense to put them together here, for instance: whether one can be substituted for another, whether they are incompatible and so forth. The meaning that they have within this game is not to be seen simply in what we do with them or how we react to them in this game.”6
A little later this author said that
“… if I know you can speak, then it makes sense for me to ask what you mean, to try to get you to say more clearly what you want, and to ask you questions about it: just as truly as it makes sense for me to answer you. The example of the builders does not seem to allow for any of these. Neither could reply to the other — there is no such thing and it would have no sense. And there can be nothing of the sort so long as the meaning of the utterance is confined to “what you do with it” in this particular connection”.7
Wittgenstein had suggested that a system of designators (similar to a community’s list of names - one for each member) operates like a primitive language. Rhees has contradicted his suggestion that the system of sounds described by Wittgenstein can be called a language. A designator used referentially operates as a single name in a proposition but to understand this use of the designator requires an understanding of the expression in other circumstances. Ability to use a designator in another routine, context or language game is part of what it means to make sense. This was seen earlier in cases where the existence of something was questioned. I would further suggest that it is along these lines that an understanding of reference will be found. Reference appears to be irreducible, that is, explanations or theories in terms such as baptisms or intentions will ultimately be unsatisfactory. Problems which may arise from the use of referring expressions have to be examined in the light of the fact that referring cannot be further simplified and that referring expressions are part of language — they obey the rules of language — and without language they make no sense. Identifying the referent is not a separate issue from referring. It is referring. If the referring expression is used and understood there is no further process involved enabling the referent to be identified as, for example, occurs when designators are used attributively. A search of the environment is required to discover the object or objects which are denoted by the designator used attributively.
An example of a further problem involving designators used referentially arises from Russell’s first puzzle. What was said previously about this puzzle when both designators were used referentially was not totally adequate. This is clearer if the example is changed to the sentence ‘Hesperus is Phosphorous’. This claim of identity involving these two designators would usually imply that either “Hesperus” or “Phosphorous” be substituted in any proposition involving the other without altering the truth value of that proposition. Yet the history of being known and referred to as “Hesperus” is not shared by “Phosphorus”. The same object has two distinct names. An attempt to answer this may be made using Donnellan’s distinction between the referential and attributive use of designators.
It may be the case that any proposition that does not allow a substitution without altering the truth value only occurs if at least one of the designators is used attributively. The sentence ‘Hesperus is Phosphorous’ would therefore mean either
‘That particular object “Hesperus” is also known as “Phosphorous”’
or
‘Whatever is known as “Hesperus” is the same object as “Phosphorus”.’
This approach has some appeal as any proposition which does not allow a substitution without altering the truth value presumably involves the different names by which this planet is called. If such a point is being made then at least one of the names will be used to denote rather then to refer to planet. If on the other hand, it is wondered how the can have more than one name then a broader approach is required. It is reasonable to suppose that in each context only one designation is introduced but this is not necessary. It is possible to baptise something giving it more than one name and assume that each name will be used at will. The history of the uses of these names may well diverge so that ultimately an identity claim may be informative. If this does happen, then two distinct contexts are implied in which the different names are used. Again Kripke’s theory appears to be wrong as he suggests that the referent be identified because of its link with its baptism. If there were two baptisms then the identity statement will be informative showing how the two names identify the same object. In the example just given, no identity statement will be more informative then saying that a = a, as they share the same baptism and hence according to Kripke, have no distinct identification.
As Kripke noted in his ‘Santa Claus’ example, he admitted that a name can change from its original referent. This is true of all designators, not just names. Good examples abound in Science of designators changing their denotation and changing what they refer to. A scientific term is to be understood in the context of the scientific theory in which it plays a part. However a term may survive its theory just as a term may change its referent because of the advance of science. Initially I believe the term ‘light’ was used only used as a contrast to dark. Talk about this ‘light’ travelling is nonsense and even now we do not talk about the speed of darkness. By ‘light’ we now refer to a stream of photons. On the other hand the disease of ‘Mongolism’ still refers to the same disease which was labelled by Dr Down. Dr Down believed he had discovered proof of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race as this disease, this retardation, (he thought) showed a regression to another race. Now there is a different theory — all about extra chromosomes — and the denotation of this term has changed, just as happened for ‘light’ but in this case the referent has not changed. (Because of the racist origins and connotations of the name ‘mongolism’ medicine now uses ‘Down’s Syndrome’ or ‘Trisomy-21’)
Designators are used only in language contexts. The sounds by Wittgenstein’s builders were not designators. There is one consequence of this for philosophy which I wish to point out. A study of any subject cannot be divorced from language and the situations in which the subject appears. Abstractions cannot be studied without looking at sentences where the concept is employed and the context which evokes this sentence. One rule that I would suggest consistent with this is in the philosophy of action. In any context there is a ‘right’ description of the action. Permissible descriptions follow rules in language governing how actions are to be described. A description must be responsive to the context which evokes this comment. Unless there is a story being told or a specific question asked, there is really no ‘right’ description. Imagine that someone is going to work. He is a little late and as he is driving along a policeman stops him and asks ‘Do you realise you were exceeding eighty kilometres per hour?’ To this our late worker replied ‘No sir, I am going to work’. In this story it is acceptable for me to call the person “our late worker”; equally I could have used another description such ‘the driver’, ‘the speedster’ consistent with the story but because of the question asked by the policemen the answer given, as a description of what the person was doing, was not right.